How Trump’s bailout and a midterm victory converted Milei’s emergency program into a semi-permanent model—and what that says about libertarians willing to excuse it.
The poverty rate was ~42% before Milei came to power. It is now down to ~32%.
I don't think it is accurate to call that "surging poverty" or conclude that the "warnings about poverty surges ... were accurate". Nor to say "it remains higher than when Milei took office" or that it "remains above pre-Milei levels".
I think we’re actually talking about two different comparisons.
INDEC’s own sequence shows a clear poverty surge after Milei took office.
Second half of 2023 (end of the previous government): poverty was 41.7%.
First half of 2024 (Milei’s first six months, after the 54% devaluation and shock measures): poverty jumped to about 52.9–53%, the highest in roughly two decades.
That is the “poverty surge” I was talking about: a roughly 11 percentage‑point spike in the wake of Milei’s initial package, on top of already very high poverty.
The ~32–38% numbers are later readings, after the initial shock.
For the second half of 2024, INDEC reports poverty at 38.1%, down sharply from that 52.9% peak as monthly inflation came off its extremes.
In the first half of 2025, INDEC reports 31.6% poverty, a further improvement as inflation decelerated.
So if someone compares “about 53% at the peak in early 2024” to “about 32% by mid‑2025,” it’s true that poverty is now lower than at the peak and even lower than the late‑2023 41.7% level.
Why I still describe it as a surge, and why “remains above pre‑Milei” can be true in context.
My claim about “surging poverty” referred to the first phase of Milei’s program, when poverty rose from an already terrible ~42% at the end of 2023 to more than half the population in the first half of 2024.
The later fall in the rate does not erase the fact that millions were pushed into poverty during that shock period, and that many are still in what some economists now call “near‑poverty”—above the official line but with severely eroded real incomes and social supports.
Depending on exactly which “pre‑Milei” baseline we use (INDEC’s 41.7% for 2H 2023, UCA’s 57.4% in January 2024, or longer‑run averages), we can end up with different, defensible statements about whether current poverty is “above” or “below” pre‑Milei levels. My point was about the trajectory around the transition: a sharp spike in poverty as the adjustment hit, followed by partial relief.
So I’m happy to clarify the wording and be precise about the time window. If the commenter’s 32% figure is referencing the latest 2025 INDEC data, then yes, that’s lower than at the end of 2023, and I should be explicit that the “surge” happened in early 2024 rather than being a statement about the very latest readings. But it’s still accurate to say that poverty surged in the immediate aftermath of Milei’s measures, even if subsequent disinflation and partial recovery have pulled the headline rate back down.
The poverty rate was ~42% before Milei came to power. It is now down to ~32%.
I don't think it is accurate to call that "surging poverty" or conclude that the "warnings about poverty surges ... were accurate". Nor to say "it remains higher than when Milei took office" or that it "remains above pre-Milei levels".
I think we’re actually talking about two different comparisons.
INDEC’s own sequence shows a clear poverty surge after Milei took office.
Second half of 2023 (end of the previous government): poverty was 41.7%.
First half of 2024 (Milei’s first six months, after the 54% devaluation and shock measures): poverty jumped to about 52.9–53%, the highest in roughly two decades.
That is the “poverty surge” I was talking about: a roughly 11 percentage‑point spike in the wake of Milei’s initial package, on top of already very high poverty.
The ~32–38% numbers are later readings, after the initial shock.
For the second half of 2024, INDEC reports poverty at 38.1%, down sharply from that 52.9% peak as monthly inflation came off its extremes.
In the first half of 2025, INDEC reports 31.6% poverty, a further improvement as inflation decelerated.
So if someone compares “about 53% at the peak in early 2024” to “about 32% by mid‑2025,” it’s true that poverty is now lower than at the peak and even lower than the late‑2023 41.7% level.
Why I still describe it as a surge, and why “remains above pre‑Milei” can be true in context.
My claim about “surging poverty” referred to the first phase of Milei’s program, when poverty rose from an already terrible ~42% at the end of 2023 to more than half the population in the first half of 2024.
The later fall in the rate does not erase the fact that millions were pushed into poverty during that shock period, and that many are still in what some economists now call “near‑poverty”—above the official line but with severely eroded real incomes and social supports.
Depending on exactly which “pre‑Milei” baseline we use (INDEC’s 41.7% for 2H 2023, UCA’s 57.4% in January 2024, or longer‑run averages), we can end up with different, defensible statements about whether current poverty is “above” or “below” pre‑Milei levels. My point was about the trajectory around the transition: a sharp spike in poverty as the adjustment hit, followed by partial relief.
So I’m happy to clarify the wording and be precise about the time window. If the commenter’s 32% figure is referencing the latest 2025 INDEC data, then yes, that’s lower than at the end of 2023, and I should be explicit that the “surge” happened in early 2024 rather than being a statement about the very latest readings. But it’s still accurate to say that poverty surged in the immediate aftermath of Milei’s measures, even if subsequent disinflation and partial recovery have pulled the headline rate back down.